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4ABSTRACT
The present study is an attempt at a detailed diagnosis of the
accumulated inefficiency in the Indian power sector, the consequent
reform drives, and the political economy involved in these aspects. The
discussion in the wider canvas of the national scenario is substantiated
by focusing on the Kerala power sector, taken for illustrative purpose. It
is shown that much of the capacity/energy deficit we experience today
could be easily avoided with some achievable functional improvement
in the power sector. We also estimate, on some very plausible
assumptions, the avoidable cost of inefficiency at a few amenable
functional levels and find it to represent about one-third of the reported
cost of electricity supply in India in 1997-98!  Given such scope for cost
reduction, the attempts at tariff hikes amount to transferring the
inefficiency onto the customers. Based on these observations, we argue
that the present system predicament is due to problems that are just
internal to the system. This then implies that there do remain sufficient
quarters for remedial exercises, meant to remove the problems that stand
in the way of the SEBs’ improved performance. In other words, what the
system badly requires is essence-specific reforms, not structure-specific
ones. We hence question the (unfounded) logic of the structural reform
in the sector now posited as the panacea. We also list out a number of
feasible suggestions for the improved performance of the sector, in the
context of Kerala.
JEL Classification:  H1; H4; L94; P16; Q4.
Key words: Indian power sector, inefficiency, reform, political
economy,  equity.
5“Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
Surely some revelation is at hand;
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.”
- W. B. Yeats (‘The Second Coming’)
1.  Introduction
This paper is the fifth in the series of working papers, arising out
of the research study on the power sector in India titled Plight of the
Power Sector in India: Inefficiency, Reform and Political Economy.
A separate and comprehensive study report has also been completed.
The purpose of this working paper is to give, in a condensed form, the
main issues, findings, and conclusions of the research study. Within the
larger canvas of the national scenario, we have given particular attention
to Kerala by way of illustration.
Power development is placed in the concurrent list of the Indian
Constitution,  as a joint responsibility of both the provincial states and
the Centre. The total installed capacity (IC) grew at an average annual
compound growth rate of 8.65 per cent during the last four decades from
63,223.11 mega watt (MW) in 1957-58 to 89,090 MW in 1997-98. Out of
the total IC in 1997-98, 63.3 per cent was owned by the States, 30.7 per
cent by the Centre, and 6 per cent was in the private sector. Actual
generation increased during these four decades at a rate of 9.45 per cent
p. a., from 11,369.14 million units (MU; 1 unit = 1 kWh) in 1957-58 to
4,20,405 MU in 1997-98, and total sales of electricity at a rate of 9.0 per
cent p. a., from 9,345 MU to 2,93,479 MU   respectively.
This seemingly impressive growth, however, conceals much of
the inadequacies of the system; its deficient capacity, lagging far behind
the growing demand, has plunged the country into a chronic shortage
situation – with an energy deficit of 11.5 per cent and a peak load deficit
of 18 per cent by the end of the 8th Plan (1996-97). Still worse, the per
capita consumption of electricity in India has been one of the lowest in
the world. The immediate victims of the widening load-capacity gap
have been the quality and reliability of the power supplied; for example,
the Kerala system operates under low voltage and low frequency (some
times up to 47.5 Hz, instead of 50 Hz) to reduce load further in addition
to regular power cuts and load shedding, that have become the rule of
the day.
The cumulative effect of a legion of forces of inefficiency has
been at work behind this plight of shortages such as inadequate capacity
addition, low capacity utilisation, and very high transmission and
distribution (T&D) loss. Adding to these infirmities of inadequacies
have been the financial failures from a host of other factors – irrational
pricing practices and over-manning, sponsored by political pampering
of across-the-board subsidies at the cost of efficiency, and an infamously
flourishing ‘x-inefficiency culture’. In this background, the capacity-
deficient Indian power sector had the rude shock when confronted with
the fiscal crisis begotten revelation that the conventional budgetary
funds support for capital augmentation programmes had dried up. The
7ill-ridden performance of the sector had already left it penniless and
penurious. The predicament thus posed had also its ready-made solution
prominently decked on its cap – the private sector. But the Indian capital
market was too feeble to support the sector and hence, the significance
of the foreign sector. Thus has commenced the siege of power sector
reforms in India.
In what follows, we attempt to look into the above aspects for a
possible explanation of what in their behaviour trajectories have
warranted reforms in the power sector in India in general and Kerala in
particular.  The references to Kerala situation in this paper are largely
illustrative in purpose in the wider canvas of the national scenario, and
our observations on Kerala apply to most other states, though in varying
degrees. The following section provides the background that has
provoked our study into the dynamic causes of the accumulated
inefficiency in the Indian power sector that are discussed in detail in
section 3. Section 4 questions the (unfounded) logic of the structural
reform in the sector now posited as the panacea, and section 5 lists out a
number of feasible suggestions for the improved performance of the
sector, in the context of Kerala. The last section sums up the discussion.
2.    The Background
The Electric Utility as an Integrated System
As in the case of any other product, supply of electricity also
involves three distinct functions of production (generation),
transportation to market (transmission) and retail supply (distribution),
the only difference being that electricity is non-storable in its usable
form and hence must be generated the moment it is demanded for. This
in turn requires instantaneous co-ordination and integration of the three
vertical functions which is technically facilitated by the continuous,
instant flow of electricity from the generator to the end-use equipment
at a velocity approaching that of light. Thus an electric utility is distinctly
8characterised by the technical necessity and significance of vertical
integration.
In addition to this technical condition for centralisation is an
economic requirement for the integrated functioning of the electric
utility. This emanates from its natural monopoly status, granted by its
characteristic cost complementarity that occurs in the presence of
economies of scale and scope. The economies of ‘non-convexities’ (i.e.,
the economies of overhead costs, Clark 1923) in turn are related to the
asset specificity that characterises the electric utility. Asset specificity
refers to the relationship-specific investment, for example, in the
transmission and distribution sectors, which, once sunk, has little value
in alternative uses (i.e., other than the intended one).  The large scale
transmission (and the associated primary distribution) asset specificity
arises in the context of the site specificity of the hydropower plants and
the mine-mouth coal plants. The size constraint, in favour of large plants
in the generation sector, also involves economies.  The consequent
vertically integrated natural monopoly position of the electric utility
thus ensures productive efficiency in the sense that the cost of supply is
minimised by having a single firm supply electricity (under which
condition the cost function is said to be sub-additive).  Securing such
productive efficiency, however, can be disastrous if the monopoly is in
the hands of private profiteers with the functional behaviour of setting
the output below optimum and the price above marginal cost, causing
dead weight loss. Such allocative inefficiency may be avoided in principle
in a competitive market of many firms, which, on the other hand, will
violate the productive efficiency criterion, favouring a single firm in the
industry. Nationalisation of the natural monopoly in the general interests
of the society can resolve this dilemma and ensure both allocative and
productive efficiency and equity. This is the economic rationale as well
as the welfare justification for the electric utility being in the pubic sector.
9Dysfunctionings in the Public Sector
This in-principle organisational superiority notwithstanding, the
public sector in general has remained in practice at the receiving end of
a number of dysfunctionings. A justificatory setting has also been in the
making here. The market is given a far-flung recognition as providing
sufficient signals for efficient performance of the economic agents,
despite the fact that the actual situation seldom simulates this perfection.
Juxtaposed with such an ideal picture, the non-market behaviour of a
State sector easily falls under an impression of inevitable doom of
inefficiency. Unfortunately, history has yielded enough corroborating
substance to this tendency, turning it out into an almost universal truth,
in terms of the infamous dysfunctionings under a number of quasi-
socialist systems especially in the Eastern Europe. Added to this have
been the costly consequences of pork-barrel politics in the Third World
countries of making a fetish of socialist institutional forms sans essence
– with unscrupulous corruption ingrained in the whole body politic, moral
hazard and the consequent x-inefficiency syndrome have cankered all
the functional commitments. In the absence of productivity
consciousness, internal resource generation meant for further capacity
expansion in the State sector has often drawn blank, requiring heavy
State financing. The cumulative effects of all these functional
irregularities have reached such a pass as to take the public sector for
granted as structurally inefficient. This dynamics of destiny have had
enough room for its full play in the Indian power sector too.
Electric Utility in India – A Saga of Dysfunctionings
As in the case of other infrastructure facilities with high capital
intensity and long gestation period, that stood to deter any
entrepreneurial initiative by a nascent private sector, the responsibility
of power development also was originally shouldered by the State in
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India. Power is a concurrent subject under the Indian Constitution, its
development being a joint responsibility of the central and provincial
state governments.  However,  since 1956 till the 1970s, the subject had
almost exclusively been confined to the State sector with an accelerated
growth. In the 1980s, on the other hand, the state sector enthusiasm
dried up, and the weight of capacity addition shifted from the state to
the central sector. And the private sector has been assigned a major role
in power generating capacity expansion since the turn of the 1990s.
This variable trajectory of investment behaviour illustrates the effects
of the ilfare of the power sector in India in terms of the financing capacity
for development.
Even though the State Electricity Boards (SEBs), established for
the rationalisation of power development at the state level, were
statutorily required by the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948 to function
as autonomous corporations, they were in effect regarded as promotional
agencies, expected to subserve the social, political and economic
policies of the governments. (The central sector utilities, on the other
hand, are corporations, like the private ones, under the Companies Act.)
The patronising policies of the State resulted in overstaffing, especially
at the non-technical, administrative level, involving unwarranted cost
increases and in irrational pricing practices for subsidised power sales
in the name of industrialisation, agricultural development as well as
domestic sector distributional considerations, all tainted with political
motives. The State’s commitment on rural electrification, as translated
through the SEBs on their responsibility also imposed heavy cost
burdens. Although the State was required to fully compensate the SEBs
for its induced inefficiencies in terms of subsidised power sales and
rural electrification duties, the compensation was irregular and
inadequate, causing substantial cumulative losses to the Boards.
The government intervention further extended to the very day to
day organisational affairs of the SEBs. The socio-political dynamics in
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different states resulted in a situation of widespread corrupt practices of
nepotism, at the cost of merit, ability and efficiency. Political
considerations dictated the appointment and the tenure of office of the
top management personnel, and this retarded their commitment and
involvement in serious independent policy making. A general lethargic
indisposition for accountability, stemming from a steady enervating
erosion of competitive management values infected the institutional
texture to the bottom. This was also due to the management culture, in
the bureaucratic ways of functioning, inherited by the SEBs as they had
been carved out of the earlier government departments. In such contexts,
self-interest maximisation drives in a favourable climate of information
asymmetry and incomplete contracts stood to stimulate moral hazard
effects – that is, default and breach of trust in doing one’s duty committed,
giving rise to a sort of x-inefficiency. The unaccountability culture in
its accumulated scale worked along with the direct government
intervention behind the dysfunctionings of the SEBs.
It should be stressed  that the performance of the SEBs was largely
determined for a long time by the assertions and defenses of their
statutorily intended promotional role in power development. The SEBs
were to subserve the socio-economic policies of the State and hence
expected not to view every aspect of developmental activities exclusively
from the point of view of profit or return, as highlighted by the
Venkataraman Committee of 1964. Thus there was no compulsive
requirement, till the late seventies (till the 1978 amendment of the Section
59 of the E(S) Act, 1948), for the SEBs to break even, as also even to
provide for full depreciation and/or interest payable on Government
loans, both of which could, under the Statute, be provided for only if
there were adequate surpluses after meeting all other obligations. Thus
there seemed to be no idea, let alone requirement, of the SEBs contributing
internal resources to expansion programmes. The SEBs have not yet
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come out of that spell of unaccountable, non-commercial performance,
and in general continue to have negative internal resources.
A number of committees, for example, the Venkataraman
Committee of 1964, examined the functioning of the SEBs and
recommended a net return of 3 per cent on capital base, after providing
for operation and maintenance charges, contribution to depreciation and
general reserves, and interest on loan. However, the 1978 amendment to
the principles of financial performance of SEBs contained in Section 59
of the 1948 Act did not stipulate a specific figure of return to be earned,
but merely provided that the Boards should earn a positive return ‘after
taking credit for any subvention from the state government’, and after
meeting all expenses properly chargeable to revenues, including
operating, maintenance and management expenses, taxes on income and
profits, depreciation and interest charges. The amendment also recognised
the desirability of the SEBs having part of their capital as equity and
allowed any state government to notify the SEB as a body corporate.
However, the government wisdom could not digest such desirabilities,
lest it should forgo a political cornucopia of populism. And the SEBs
remained in the same old spell of unaccountable, non-commercial
performance, leaving little internal resources for expansion.
The Irreversible Surgery: The Surge of Reforms
All these developments necessarily had the making of an apparent
harbinger of radical mutation. The inflated inability of both the state
and the central power sectors to finance further capacity expansion led
ipso facto to the foregone conclusion of large scale private participation
as the sole solution to the worsening power shortage situation. Both the
local and global settings were changing in colour in favour of a
triumphant return of liberalism, following the fall of socialism. The new
private sectorisation drives had an apparently formidable backing of a
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now widely justified ‘there-is-no-alternative (TINA)’ logic. It should be
stressed that the Thatcherite privatisation drives in the UK and the
Reagonomics of deregulation in the US could be projected on a TINA
argument only against the backdrop of the unfortunate historical
incidence of the infamous dysfunctionings in the quasi-socialist countries
in the Eastern Europe, where reactions and revolts favoured a ‘back to
market’ transition. And finally, as the Soviet Union crumbled and fell,
liberalism came up in the void from the shadow as the only path to the
Promised Land.
The international financial institutions headed by the World Bank
could make full use of these developments by means of contrived ‘tied
aids’ in favour of a liberalised world for private enterprise interests.
Though the euphemism of structural adjustment entered into the
international parlance in 1980 with the introduction of the World Bank’s
structural adjustment loan (SAL) as a new type of credit, in the wake of
the Chilean reforms, the Bank’s stress upon the ‘economy-wide programs
of reforms’ got much more strengthened along with liberalism.  Later on
the Bank switched emphasis from SAL to sectoral adjustment loans with
narrower policy objectives, though the general policy thrust is similar.
For added momentum, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also rose
to the occasion in 1986 with a new Structural Adjustment Facility,
intended to provide medium-term BoP assistance to low income countries
facing protracted BoP crisis in return for a programme of policy measures
dictated by the IMF. It was augmented at the end of 1987 by an Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility with considerably greater resources.
Most of the countries in Africa, Latin America (Chile, Argentina,
Brazil, Uruguay, etc.) and Asia (New Zealand, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Thailand, etc.) are ‘progressing’ on such reform path that leads especially
to a deregulated privatised electricity industry. Most of the former
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Communist Bloc countries have also started large scale restructuring:
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Croatia, who are also keen to
join the European Union (EU). Romania and Slovak Republic have,
however, so far desisted from committing themselves to the ultimate
goal of electricity privatisation. Among the OECD countries, the UK,
Canada, Germany, Spain, and Australia have made ‘great strides’ towards
privatisation, while liberalisation gathers momentum across the US,
Ireland, Sweden, Norway, and New Zealand. The only electricity industry
in the public sector that still stands impervious to the sweeping waves of
the so called reform reagents is the Electrcite de France in the hands of
the French Government.
 In this receptive background, India too became a party to the brave
new world. The turn was facilitated, as in the case of other developing
countries, by the infamous fiscal crisis at the dawn of the 1990s.
Confronted with the consequences of the Gulf war in a political flux of
frequent changes in Government, India plunged into an apparent balance
of payments (BoP) crisis in the second half of 1990-91. As India’s credit
rating in international capital markets nose-dived, access to external
capital borrowing narrowed and substantial capital flight occurred out
of the country. In June 1991, despite a severe squeeze on imports, India
appeared wavering on the verge of a default on external debt obligations
for the first time in her history. However, she survived the crisis, and she
emerged unscathed, but with a new flag of ideological allegiance in her
hand. She emerged enlightened “that the economy needed substantial
reforms if the crisis was to be fully overcome” (Government of India,
Economic Survey, 1991-92: 11). The fiscal correction that followed the
awakening meant still meagre provisions to an already starving power
sector, designed on the premise that further investments required in the
sector should be financed from internal resources. A system traditionally
attuned to unaccountability and hence functionally sick and financially
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wreck, the SEBs thus left in the lurch by the Governments to fend for
itself, had then only one way open before them – that leading to the
private sector. But the domestic private sector remained meek and weak,
ergo, the door was to be opened to the global agents. And the siege then
started – the siege of power sector reforms!
 Thus functional inadequacies and financial infirmities of the
SEBs, though entirely avoidable, came in handy for a mis-characterisation
of the whole sector: the costly disfunctionings were unreasonably
identified with economic inefficiency, associated with the standard
notion of some market structure devoid of competition. Thus mistaking
functional inefficiency for structural/organisational deviations made it
easier to put up a foregone conclusion in favour of a need for restructuring
the power sector. And there opened up in the Indian power sector a vast
vista to the ambitious global capital to emulate Enron-tragedy.1
It is this background that has provoked our look into the aetiology
of the plight of the Indian power sector in terms of the accumulated
inefficiency and the consequent initiatives of reform process as well as
the political economy of that plight.
3.    The Aetiology of the Plight
Inadequate Capacity Addition and Utilisation
For one thing, in no Plan period the target in IC could actually be
achieved, the cumulative slippage between the target and the achievement
remaining well over 20 per cent. The excessive time and cost overruns
in most of the public sector power projects stood to worsen the situation
arising from the inability of the State to undertake its responsibility for
adequate capacity addition in the name of a shrinking coffer.
Poor capacity utilisation has substantially corroded the system
performance. Capacity utilisation in terms of energy generated per kW
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of IC grew over the last four decades in India at an average annual
compound rate of just 0.73 per cent from 3,527.38 kWh/kW in 1957-58
(utilisation of 40.27 per cent) to 4,718.9 kWh/kW (53.87 per cent) in
1997-98. Thus in 1997-98 (even in the face of deficit), only 54 per cent
of the existing IC in India was utilised. As many as 11 (out of 19) SEBs
had a use factor much less than this all-India average, including Kerala
and Tamil Nadu in the South, and only four (as well as the Central Sector
with 63 per cent) had a rate higher than 60 per cent. It should be noted
that for a hydro-power dominant system, such as in Himachal Pradesh,
Meghalaya, Kerala, and, to some extent now, Karnataka, utilisation
efficiency should be evaluated with respect to firm power capacity (the
always available and dependable capacity corresponding to the
minimum stream flow and storage) rather than with respect to IC. Thus
taking into account the hydel firm power capacity of 714.5 MW of
Kerala in 1997-98, the actual capacity utilisation comes out to be
6,308.46 kWh/kW or about 72 per cent. However, a distressing question
here concerns about the overcapitalisation, i.e., the wide gap of ‘waste’
between the IC and the dependable power of the hydro-plants; the latter
being just 42.3 per cent of the hydel  IC in Kerala in 1997-98.
Considerable timely efforts on firm power augmentation projects are
called for here, besides those on the usual IC additions.
Huge T & D Loss
Still much more dismal is the condition of capacity utilisation in
terms of energy sold per KW of IC – with a growth rate of only 0.32 per
cent p. a., from  2,899.37 KWh/KW (33.10 per cent utilisation) to 3,294.19
KWh/KW (37.61 per cent) over the same period. The growth over the
last four decades of energy generated and sold indicates an elesticity of
energy sales with respect to energy generated of just 0.84. This highlights
high levels of auxiliary consumption and extremely high transmission
and distribution (T&D) losses. Over 82 billion units of electricity were
17
lost in T & D in various States in India in 1997-98. The losses increased
from 19.8 per cent in 1992-93 to 23 per cent in 1996-97, and then
declined marginally to 21.8 per cent in the next year. These are very
high by international standards. In almost all the States the losses remain
very high, from 15.2 per cent in Maharashtra to 47.5 per cent in Jammu
& Kashmir in 1997-98. T & D losses in Kerala was in a satisfactorily
comparable position till some two decades back, the losses having been
less than 15 per cent. However, it increased to substantial extent in the
following years, averaging about 24 per cent during 1982-83 to 1996-
97, with a reported peak at 29 per cent in 1987-88. In the recent years,
the loss is reported to be declining to 17 per cent. It should be stressed
here that even these high figures are only underestimates, put out by the
SEBs in their eagerness to record reduced transit losses. Since a modicum
of metering is done only at the consumption end (that too barring
agricultural consumption in most of the states), the SEBs find it
convenient to put up a comfortable loss rate and dump the remaining
part of the unaccountable-for energy in the manipulated figures of
generation and auxiliary and agricultural consumption. A detailed
investigation, conducted by the Integrated Rural Technology Centre
(IRTC), into the distribution losses in a typical rural electrical major
section, viz., Kongad of Palakkad distribution circle in Kerala, has found
the losses to be of the order of 35 per cent from the point of transformers,
about 85 per cent of which could be accounted for by technical losses,
with 30 per cent of the energy meters being faulty (quoted in CDS 2001:
57-58). Along with such high technical losses thrive losses through
theft and unauthorised drawal; in 1997-98, the anti-theft squad of the
KSEB detected cases of theft of energy worth Rs. 1.21 crores, and in




Besides these technical inefficiency constraints of the power sector
in India are the institutional and organisational factors. Excessive
interference in the affairs of the SEBs by the State governments, in their
careerist pursuit of patronising the populist social security concerns,
has resulted, for one example,  in over-employment in the SEBs,
especially and more unwarrentedly, in administration section. The
number of employees per MU of energy sold in India in 1990-91 was
about 5 (implying a labour productivity of 0.2 MU per employee), while
it was 0.2  (or 5 MU per employee or 25 times higher than that in India)
in Chile, Norway, and USA, about 0.6 (or 1.7 MU per employee) in New
Zealand, Argentina, and UK, and less than 2.5 (or 0.4 MU per employee)
in some developing countries such as China, Philippines, and Indonesia
(Rao et al. 1998-99: 42-43). Though the ratio declined marginally to
3.6 in 1996-97, still higher than the standards abroad, wide disparity
prevails across the States, from 41.4 in Arunachal Pradesh to 1.9 in
Gujarat. Kerala had a ratio (3.8) somewhat corresponding to the all-
India average, and slightly higher than her neighbours.
Another institutional factor breeding inefficiency has been the
lack of professional management with commitment, accountability,
inclination and initiative in decision making. A steady enervating
erosion of competitive management values has sapped the institutional
texture to the bottom, giving rise to all-round x-inefficiency. For one
thing, continuity of management by top personnel at the policy making
level has been a perpetual loss. In most of the SEBs, the average tenure
of Chairmen and Chief Engineers is very limited – for an example, four
Chairmen of KSEB in 1973-74 had tenures less than one year, out of
which one of them had less than three months (Government of Kerala,
1984: 41). The story still continues and is the same with other SEBs
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also. The appointments being mostly on seniority basis, by the time a
person reaches the top chair, he would be on the verge of superannuation,
that retards his commitment and involvement in serious policy making.
Committees after committees have recommended that appointments be
made based on selection, and that the selected person with proven ability
and integrity should have at least 2 to 5 years further service for
superannuation (Government of Kerala, 1984: 41– 42; Government of
Kerala, 1997: 57–58).
Moreover, the socio-political dynamics in different States have
led to a situation of wide-spread corrupt practices of nepotism, all at the
cost of merit, ability, and efficiency. A general lethargic indisposition
for accountability booms under such umbrellas of patronage.
Leibenstein’s  analysis  of  internal  motivation  to  efficiency  starts
from  the premise  that  contracts  for  labour  supply  within  the  firm
are  incomplete, they  do  not include a specification of the job, so the
efficiency of the labour depends on the motivation to effort, which by all
counts is constrained by his preference for less effort, confined in an
‘inert area’. This problem is more acute in the public sector of many
developing countries, where loose contract, if at all any, guarantees job
security till superannuation, whatsoever be the output of his effort.
Besides the superior selection procedure, linking the terms of job
continuity and remuneration to productivity would certainly yield a
sea of change.
The Cost of Inefficiency
And all these inefficiencies come out in inflated proportion in the
cost of electricity supply. This in turn implies some feasible sure cures
for the maladies in terms of achievable improvements in performance.
Thus allowing for some improvements in operational, T & D, and man-
power planning efficiencies2  would reduce the unit cost of supply of all-
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SEBs substantially, by 60.77 paise per unit sold, to Rs. 1.67/unit from
Rs. 2.28/unit in 1997-98. For Kerala, the unit cost saving is 60.10 paise/
unit, giving a unit supply cost of Rs. 1.32/unit instead of the reported Rs.
1.92/unit, and for Delhi, 127.37 paise/unit, the unit supply cost reducing
to Rs. 2.24/unit from Rs. 3.51/unit. With a 1:1 debt-equity capital base,
the unit electricity supply cost would still go down for all-SEBs to Rs.
1.52/unit sold, and to Kerala, Rs. 1.09/unit (Table 1). The unit cost of
inefficiency in the State sector is about 33.2 per cent of the reported unit
cost of electricity supply, and in Kerala, about 43.3 per cent, and in
Delhi, 36.3 per cent. And this is regardless of the unquantifiable cost of
inefficiency at all other levels! Now the pertinent question is: Should the
consumer be made to pay for this inefficiency?
Now compare this with the average revenue (AR) realised from
sales of Rs. 1.85/unit in that year. This would yield an additional revenue
of about Rs. 9,459 crores over and above the total cost of electricity
supply – a commercial profit! Similarly, Kerala could earn a profit of
Rs. 121.06 crores and Delhi, Rs. 349.72 crores!  To this extent then the
reported commercial loss of the SEBs, attributed to the so-called unit-
cost-unrecoverable AR, turns out to be nothing but inefficiency-caused
loss. If we allow for the expenses capitalised, then the total cost in the
accounting sense would still decline and commercial profit increase.
And the vociferous arguments and assertions for steep rises in tariff rates,
proposed to be required to contain the increasing supply costs in order
to save the SEBs from the red, reduces to calculated camouflaging of
pampered inefficiency.
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Table 1. Unit Cost Savings From Efficiency Improvement for
 1997-98 (Paise/Unit)
                 I N D I A        K E R A L A
Ps/unit % Ps/unit %
1. Reported unit cost of power
supply  in 1997-98 227.89 100.00 192.14 100.00
2. Cost savings obtainable
(i)  in power purchase, from
 operational efficiency
 improvement 49.72 21.82 40.32 20.98
(ii)  in establishment &
 administration, from reduction
 in over-manning 11.05 4.85 19.78 10.29
(iii) in interest payments, from
 introduction of 1:1 debt-equity
 ratio 14.85 6.52 23.13 12.04
3.  Total cost savings possible 75.62 33.18 83.23 43.32
4. ‘Efficient’ unit cost of power supply 152.27 66.82 108.91 56.68
5. Average revenue realised in 1997-98 184.50 80.96 124.60 64.85
    (121.17) (114.41)
6. Unit commercial profit realisable 32.23 15.69
7. Electricity sold in 1997-98  (MU) 293479 7715.50
8. Commercial profit realisable
 (Rs. Million)   94588.25 1210.60
Note:  Figures in brackets are ratio of average revenue to ‘efficient’ unit
cost.
However, this is not meant to justify the present unscientific tariff
setting.  A rational tariff structuring should, among others, aim to help
the SEB earn a reasonable return over and above the total costs, that
differ at different voltage levels, once the effect of normal distribution
loss factor also is accounted for. However, just tariffing is not sufficient.
It should be ensured that the sales revenue these tariffs yield is collected
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regularly in time. The receivables from the sale of power in Kerala in
1997-98 represented 41 % of the sales revenue, i.e., about 5 months’
sales revenue being locked up with the consumers against the maximum
allowable norm of two months’ sales revenue; the corresponding figure
for all-SEB in 1996-97 was 36 per cent, i.e., about four months’ sales
revenue. Besides these receivables against electricity supply, there are
other sundry debtors also, which, for example, in Kerala amounted to
Rs. 326 crores in 1996-97 and Rs. 319 crores in 1997-98, about 47.1 and
32.8 per cent of, or 6 and 4 months’, sales revenue respectively. Regular
and timely collection of all receivables could increase the liquidity
available with the SEBs and arrest the excessive loan-tropism. For
instance, if all the SEBs could limit the revenue arrears receivable to
nearly two months’ sales norm, additional revenue collected of Rs. 4,490
crores would be available with them in 1996-97, which in turn means
that they could dispense with additional loans of the order of about Rs.
4,500 crores in that year or be relieved of some of the old loans. In other
words, this is the cost of inefficiency in the management of sundry
debtors in 1996-97. For 1995-96, this amounts to Rs. 7,567 crores. That
every year such huge cost of liquidity restriction is left to be incurred
explains the financial accountability of the SEBs.
The picture of the settings of this plight becomes clearer as we
come closer from the general to the particular case of Kerala power
system.
The Demand Forecast Vs. The Reality
A scientific planning process is fundamental to any power system
operation. Hence the significance of a study into the adequacy of the
present planning process in the context of the widening gap between
demand and supply. This in turn necessitates to examine the accuracy
and rationale of the mechanism of power demand forecasting on one
hand, and, given the demand for projections, the adequacy of the capacity
23
addition planning as well as the operational efficiency, on the other
hand.
An objective forecasting mechanism, capturing the full
implications of the socio-economic reality, has been conspicuous by its
inadequacy in our country. Time trend projection is in general employed
for power demand estimation, without caring for any model adequacy
diagnostic checking nor accounting for possible non-stationarity in the
time series data base, even in the academic circles. In some specific
cases, estimated industrial growth rates are utilised, but without
examining the general validity of correlation or causation between the
variables. In fact, there are a large number of small scale and cottage
industries that use practically little electricity, but together contribute
significantly to the industrial product. India has for a long time been in
the grip of severe power shortage, and the use of time series data on
supply-constrained demand for future demand estimation is
fundamentally inadequate and inappropriate. Moreover, the low level
socio-economic development of India may also invalidate the demand
analysis technique in its usual framework of price-income-population
correlatives. On the other hand, Kerala with a high standard of living in
a substantially developed social environment presents significant scope
for electricity demand analysis, but in the chronic situation of power
cuts and load shedding, this too loses any sense of reality. Our
econometric exercises prove that demand analysis can in no way explain
the objective situation in the power sector of Kerala (Pillai 2001).
The actual performance of the sector in fact has been such as to
render the very exercise of power demand forecasting futile, except as
some routine ritual; the demand forecast has never had anything to do
with the capacity expansion planning prepared on a bounded budget as
well as with the actual materialised capacity additions in the system in
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any state in India. Kerala has been a typical example, with little
recognition of the need for a comprehensive development-based
perspective planning mechanism that is to ensure smooth system growth
in terms of adequate capacity expansion not only of hydropower but
also of thermal backing to the system in order both to meet the exigency
of monsoon failure and to strengthen the reliability parameters. Even
though an optimal merit order operation requires a favourable hydro-
thermal mix in generation capacity, the KSEB had for a long time evinced
an unwarranted aversion to setting up thermal plants in Kerala, and had
even ridiculed and rejected at least two times the central government’s
offers of thermal plants. As a result of the defective and myopic power
development planning, the Kerala system has remained much smaller
under a favourable condition of a domestic-sector-dominant consumption
profile.
Time and Cost Overruns
While the planning process for capacity expansion has had only
nominal relevance in force, its execution has been failing all expectations.
Not a single hydro  project in Kerala (starting with the prestigious major
project of Idukki), even the micro ones, has been left unhaunted by the
spectre of excessive time overruns, involving exorbitant opportunity costs,
extracted cleverly by collusions among the contractors, militant labour,
KSEB officials and the politicians in power. If these projects had been
completed and commissioned regularly in time, it would have saved
substantial resources, yielded additional revenue and eased the shortage
problem to a good extent. The resources thus saved could have been
utilised for further capacity expansion and it would have eased the so-
called resources crunch of the government that is unfairly used to woo
the private sector.
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The total additional sales revenue realisable during the 17 years
from 1983-84 to 1999-2000, were these projects commissioned in time,
is estimated at Rs. 886.3 crores (Table 2), or Rs. 52 crores per year! It is
very distressing to think of such a situation that the cash-strapped KSEB
has been forced to forego a revenue of about Rs. 52 crores a year on
average due to delays in getting the on-going projects commissioned in
time (Pillai and Kannan 2001). Such additional generation that could
be effected through timely completion of projects could reduce to a
good extent the costly dependence on energy imports.
Timely completion of these projects could avoid the substantial
burden of capital cost escalation also (Table 3). Such savings factor
highlights the fact that when capital cost is escalated more than what is
planned, it results in a loss of its alternative uses. Considering the
resources constraint of the Government, if these resources were used
more efficiently, then the resultant increased availability of these
resources to the Government could be used for taking up more projects.
To the extent that such actual cost escalation reflects inefficient resources
utilisation, the savings in capital cost, that could have been obtained in
the absence of cost overruns, also represents a capital waste involved.
For example, suppose that Kakkad hydro-electric project could be
commissioned in time in 1986 itself, 8 years after its construction works
started. Accounting for the general price inflation during this period, the
capital cost of this project by 1986 would be at the most only Rs. 39.66
crores, saving as much as Rs. 113.86 crores, almost enough to construct
3 more similar plants, or to add to the system capacity by another 140
MW at the nominal cost of Kakkad project! Thus the capital waste
involved in this case is equivalent to 3 more similar plants or an installed
capacity of 140 MW! Timely completion of lower Periyar project could
save as much as Rs. 189 crores, enough for a similar project of more than
200 MW capacity! The second highest savings, after Lower Periyar
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project, could come from Kuttiady extension project to the tune of Rs.
158.3 crores, almost enough for four similar or  Kakkad-type projects!
Kallada project (the only exception), even with 5 years over-run, has not
eaten up resources beyond the limits set by general price inflation.
Table  2. Extra Energy and Revenue Realisable from Timely
Completion of Projects
Firm Energy (MU) Generation (MU) Extra  Extra
Year Actual       Realisable Actual Realisable Energy  Revenue
Saleable   Realisable
(MU)    (Rs. Crores)
1983-84 3725.73 5554.13 3643.4 5431.38 1326.69 46.67
1984-85 3725.73 5554.13 4884.9 7282.02 1797.91 53.83
1985-86 4397.33 5816.13 5357.1 7085.79 1298.12 39.94
1986-87 5053.13 5816.13 4642 5342.70 508.85 24.55
1987-88 5053.13 5816.13 4093.1 4711.07 439.11 24.44
1988-89 5053.13 5816.13 4548 5234.52 521.75 29.58
1989-90 5053.13 5881.13 5075 5906.42 648.62 34.65
1990-91 5554.13 6000.73 5491 5932.32 346.28 18.35
1991-92 5554.13 6562.73 5326 6293.00 756.60 45.40
1992-93 5554.13 6675.73 6189 7438.77 987.34 73.01
1993-94 5607.13 6675.73 5822.3 6932.08 886.60 72.75
1994-95 5607.13 6675.73 6572.3 7824.62 1001.38 86.80
1995-96 5607.53 6751.13 6662 8020.34 1086.20 100.93
1996-97 5619.03 6751.13 5502.9 6611.38 887.38 84.84
1997-98 6118.43 6751.13 5188.7 5725.63 440.70 56.91
1998-99 6249.43 6751.13 7601.6 8212.07 501.95 67.52
1999-2000 6586.43 6751.13 7655.57 7846.84 158.10 26.16
Total 13593.58 886.33
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Timely completion of all other 18 projects (excluding the non-starter
Pooyankutty) could yield a mammoth saving in capital cost of Rs. 644.03
crores (or Rs. 35.8 crores per project), almost enough for 16 Kakkad-
type projects with 800 MW capacity! Since so much capital resources
have gone wasted, this 800 MW (or Rs. 644 crores) represents the capital
waste involved in the faulty planning and implementation of power
projects in Kerala. That is, the capital waste factor involved is 16 (i.e., 16
Table  3.  Capital Cost Savings
Capital Cost (Rs)    Savings in Capital Waste
Projects per  kWh of     Capital Cost Factor**
Energy Potential  (Rs. Lakhs)
Original Actual
Idukki II Stage 0.31 0.68 910.20 0.15
Idukki III Stage 0.11 0.40 844.33 1.27
Sabarigiri Augmentation 0.10 0.90 838.42 2.96
Idamalayar 0.73 2.81 4652.58 1.07
Kakkad 0.71 5.86 11386.17 2.87
Kallada 2.23 3.40 -153.26 -
Lower Periyar 1.79 7.16 18940.91 1.16
Malampuzha 5.27 12.13 339.78 1.00
Madupetty 4.56 7.47 142.23 0.42
Malankara 1.20 6.33 3124.06 3.16
Chimony 4.83 6.54* 26.89* 0.07
Peppara 3.41 5.92 184.00 0.37
Pooyankutty 3.88 12.71 NAP -
Azhutha Diversion 0.51 2.54 1027.80 2.46
Poringalkuth LB Extn 1.22 5.77 3028.05 2.43
Kuttiar Diversion 0.58 2.59 696.27 2.75
Vadakkepuzha Diversion 1.09 4.28 349.72 2.13
Vazhikkadavu Diversion 0.78 6.66 1342.28 5.23
Kuttiady Tail Race 2.65 8.61 744.06 1.36
Kuttiady Extension 4.10 26.40 15825.39 3.98
Note:  * = by 1993;  NAP = Not Applicable; ** = Equivalent to number
of Kakkad-type projects
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Kakkad-type projects)! And the KSEB still reeling down in the red, the
government lets such waste and mismanagement pass.
It is in this light then that we should examine the so called financial
‘inability’ of the SEBs (and the governments) to finance power
development in general. The basic argument put up in defence of inviting
private sector participation in power development has come out of the
resources crunch experienced by the governments. However, this defence
is turned out to be flimsy in the face of the fact that there is over
capitalisation in actual practice in the case of each project the government
has undertaken; the government could, through efficient performance,
save substantial resources, which could in turn be used for taking up
additional projects. Behind this inability works the political economy of
corruption.
Higher Outages, Overcapitalisation, and Higher T&D Loss
However, such time overruns have been generally accepted as a
convenient camouflage for large scale corruption at the high up. Thus
both the processes of planning and execution have had a track record of
inadequacy and functional failure, and the very same behavioural
characteristic has extended to the operational field also. Though hydro
plants are generally expected to be much less prone to forced outages
than thermal plants, those in Kerala stand an exception and have
registered higher forced outage rates and loss of load probability.3  Even
if the plants are available, their service is subject to firm power capacity
constraints, given normal monsoon. The technocratic tendency for
unrealistic assumptions, as already pointed out, have however led to an
undesirable situation of over-capitalisation in terms of wide divergence
between installed capacity and firm power capacity in Kerala – another
flagrant failure of planning. Then the worse occurs in the transit; a good
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proportion of the energy sent out from the inadequate firm power capacity
gets lost behind the meter – again in corrupt collusion with the Board
officials. Our study shows that reducing T&D loss to 15 % from the
presently reported 18 % could have saved about Rs. 34 crores in
additional sales revenue to the KSEB in 1997-98 and as much as Rs. 72
crores in 1998-99!  Similar calculations for the previous years (from
1982-83 to 1998-99) yields a cumulative possible saving in energy of
the order of 8000 MU and in revenue of Rs. 525  crores (Table 4). In
Table 4.  Savings Realisable from T and D Loss Reduction
Loss  Available  Total Sales (MU)    Savings Realisable
Factor  Energy with 15% Actual Energy Revenue
 (MU)     Loss (MU) (Rs. Crores)
1982-83 0.228 4544.6 3862.91 3507.90 355.01 9.00
1983-84 0.258 3766.25 3201.313 2793.00 408.31 14.36
1984-85 0.25 4938.9 4198.065 3705.00 493.07 14.76
1985-86 0.249 5558.82 4724.997 4172.00 553.00 17.02
1986-87 0.274 5126.59 4357.602 3716.00 641.60 30.96
1987-88 0.2895 5077.74 4316.079 3626.60 689.48 38.38
1988-89 0.2402 5748.8 4886.48 4387.00 499.48 28.32
1989-90 0.22 6208.75 5277.438 4859.07 418.37 22.35
1990-91 0.2157 6768.83 5753.506 5332.00 421.51 22.34
1991-92 0.2177 7155.8 6082.43 5596.00 486.43 29.19
1992-93 0.21 7406.54 6295.559 5838.50 457.06 33.80
1993-94 0.201 7825.17 6651.395 6234.16 417.23 34.24
1994-95 0.2008 8794.35 7475.198 7027.69 447.51 38.79
1995-96 0.2005 9278.2 7886.47 7414.62 471.85 43.84
1996-97 0.1996 8776.28 7459.838 7020.77 439.07 41.98
1997-98 0.1787 9395.1 7985.835 7715.49 270.34 33.68
1998-99 0.1775 11167.18 9492.103 8959.61 532.49 71.63
Total 8001.81 524.64
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other words, the inefficiency of the Kerala’s power system primarily in
terms of deficient transmission capacity and inefficient operation has
been eating away about 470 MU of energy worth Rs. 31 crores (at current
prices) every year during the last 17 years. The energy thus lost in
excess of the notional 15 per cent in fact represents a capacity of about
90 MW at 60 per cent load factor. It simply means that if the system were
efficient enough to maintain the energy loss at its maximum reasonable
level of 15 per cent per annum, it could help the system dispense with
the need for adding about 90 MW to the total installed capacity, saving
highly in investment and working expenses. That this saving was in
addition to the potential increase in revenue by 31 crores per year
highlights the immensity of the problem of the transmission loss in
Kerala.
The Political Economy of Populism and Corruption
Crowning all these dysfunctionings is the political economy of
populism and corruption. The power sector, rightly expected to subserve
the social, political, and economic policies of the State, was in effect
abused to become the translatory channel for the populist policies of
the political party in power in the various provincial states in the pursuit
of votes. For one thing, subsidised power sales in the name of
industrialisation, agricultural development, and welfare considerations
(for the domestic consumers) have been draining the Board substantially.
The fact that in general the non-electrified households and fragmented
farms belong to the poorest of the society questions the justification of
the welfare content of such across-the-board subsidy to the powerful
groups. Moreover, the appeasement strategy on the part of the supervisor
(government) in favour of the influential section of the principal (the
public in general) had a downstream extension also towards the
bureaucracy of the agent (the public utility), appearing more prominently
in overmanning, unwarrantedly in establishment and administration
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(E&A), in a populist bid of employment generation. The consequent
increase in E&A costs stands in turn to inflate the supply costs of
electricity and penalises directly the customers and further indirectly
the poor tax payers.
Along with the force of vote-premium aligns high-powered
corruption. One avenue here is the collusion between the Board officials
and erring customers, enjoying political patronage, for uninterrupted
theft of power flagrantly practised, for example, in the very capital city
of the country. The Board in effect abets them in the crime by crediting,
without verifying the authenticity of its own procedures, the power thus
lost, to the farm sector, where consumption is mostly unmetered. We
have found that about 30 to 40 per cent of what is usually reported as
agricultural power consumption in fact represents power lost in such
illegal ‘sale’ (Kannan and Pillai 2001a). Then assuming, quite reasonably,
that the actual agricultural consumption is only 65 per cent of the
reported one, the energy thieved away in connivance with all the SEBs
in 1997-98 amounted at least to 31073 MU, equivalent to Rs. 5733
crores, at a sales rate of Rs. 1.85 per unit! This, though an underestimate,
gives in effect an annual cost of corruption at only one (i.e., sale) end in
the Indian power sector. And  with the assumption of an actual 15 per
cent T&D loss in 1997-98 (including technical and inefficiency loss
due to inadequate transmission capacity), the total cost of corruption at
the sales end in the Indian power sector comes out to be a staggering Rs.
10705 crores!4  In the case of Kerala power sector, where agricultural
power consumption is mostly metered and accounts for only about 4 per
cent, such illegal ‘sale’ of power is included directly in the T&D loss.
Assuming an actual 15 per cent T&D loss in 1997-98 in Kerala against
the reported 17.9 per cent, we find that the cost of such corruption
amounts to Rs. 33.7 crores.5
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A more sophisticated way of ‘theft’ is to get the officials to allow
huge energy bills to mount up and then to write them off as ‘bad debts’.6
In our study mentioned earlier we have seen that the revenue arrears
outstanding against different consumers for all SEBs in 1996-97 was
Rs. 11,535 crores, accounting for over four months’ sales revenue, against
the maximum allowable norm of two months’ sales revenue. The excess
of outstandings over the admissible norm may then be taken as an
approximate measure of the cost of corruption involved at this end of
energy ‘theft’ in the form of deliberate non-payment by customers of
electricity charges in connivance with the officials. This amounted in
1996-97 to Rs. 4220 crores, equivalent, as we have estimated earlier, to
the additional revenue at hand if all the SEBs could limit their revenue
arrears to two months’ sales norm, and in 1995-96, to Rs. 7364 crores!
In Kerala, corruption on this front cost Rs. 175 crores in 1995-96, and
Rs. 198 crores and Rs. 252 crores in the next two years! The ‘bad debts’
written off during these three years by the KSEB were Rs. 11.8 crores,
Rs. 12.5 crores, and Rs. 14.8 crores respectively.
Another fertile field in this respect opens up out of the ‘wide
spectrum collusion’, among the contractors, trade unions, bureaucracy
of the utility, and the government, for  large scale corruption involved in
allowing for time overruns of projects and sanctioning the associated
cost escalations. Recurring unrestricted labour militancy is recognised
in general as the single factor that puts the heaviest burden on the pace
of the construction works of power projects in Kerala, largely dictated
by party-political rivalry rather than genuine labour demands, as for
example, in the construction of Idukki hydro-electric project, to begin
with. The time overruns out of the striking militancy upon one or another
pecuniary pretext essentially go into the contractors’ demand for cost
escalation, that is soon endorsed by the Board and sanctioned by the
government.7   Such rent-sharing is a widely recognised official practice
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in the power-irrigation sectors. The glaring laxity on the part of the
government in fulfilling its committed responsibility for enforcing its
authority on the contractors and workers to bind them within the
contractual terms they agreed to take up to honour is a clear indication
of its corrupt collusion. In Kerala, the time and cost overruns have afflicted
only the State power projects; the public sector NTPC thermal and the
private sector hydro projects in the State having been completed well
within their scheduled times. In this light, then, the cost escalation
sanctioned for each late-run project may rightly be taken to represent
the cost of corruption involved in construction contract sales in the power
sector of the State. Accounting for the general price inflation during the
normal construction period, this amounts to Rs. 644 crores or Rs. 36
crores per project!8  Unbelievably, it represents on an average about 60
per cent of the actual project cost! In some cases it is well above 75 per
cent.  This is all shared among the four parties involved, at the cost of the
helpless majority in the ‘principal’ set of tax payers.
Government involvement in large corruption has now become an
accepted fact of much less social concern for responsible response/
reaction. It is a common practice that in the power and irrigation sectors,
construction contracts and purchase orders are conferred at a price.9
Purchase of materials and machinery, especially power generating
equipment, involve large scale corruption, the scope of which has widened
since 1992 (post liberalisation period) with the stipulation for bilateral
credit options that necessarily involves purchases from foreign
equipment suppliers, as bilateral credit is inevitably tied.10   By the ‘side
contract’ of collusion, the Board bureaucracy may share in the price
along with its supervisor, the particular ministry in the government, or
gain other favours of larger budgets.
There have come up a number of allegations of corruption
involving ministers11  and bureaucracy in the Kerala power sector. Some
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of them have recently been convicted also.  For example, a former
Minister along with his power secretary and some top officials of the
KSEB were convicted in a case involving award of construction
contract.12  There have been allegations of corruption against other power
minister(s) in recent times too; for example, on the contract with the
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) in the case of Kozhikode and
Kasargode diesel power plants, and with a Canadian firm (SNC Lavalin
International Inc.) in the case of an extension scheme (Kuttiady hydro-
power  project). The infamous Kannur-Ennore episode is another apt
case in point here.13  Again, an Enquiry Commission in Kerala has
indicted another former power minister and his officials in the case
relating to financial irregularities, involving a loss to the KSEB of Rs.
75 crores in the award of contracts in the case of the Brahmapuram
diesel power plant; a vigilance probe is in progress into this case.14   At
national level, the infamous Jain hawala revelations have indicted a
large number of Central government officials, about half of them being
from the power sector – the NHPC (Dulhasti project) and the NTPC
(many bilaterally funded projects) actively involved.15
Such high powered corruption costs in turn go to manifest
themselves in inflated capital costs of power projects,16  allegedly
materialised since the entry of Enron. The Dabhol power project of
Enron has cost about US$ 2830 million (US$ 1.4 million per MW) as
compared with a cost of US$ 1200 million (US$ 0.64 million per MW)
for a similar plant, the 1875 MW Teesside project of Enron in England,
(Mehta 2000: 98) i.e., more than twice! This works out to be Rs. 4.48
crores per MW, much higher than the NTPC’s 645 MW gas-based Kawas
project (implemented in November 1993 at Rs. 2.32 crores a MW),
which comes in effect to Rs. 3.56 crores per MW only at an assumed
inflation rate of 10 per cent by March 1997 (Morris 1996: fn.2). The
calculations of the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) have put the
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total capital costs of an Enron-type plant at Rs. 1.91 crores a MW
(December 1997 completed costs). However, the  Ministry of Power
(MoP) has, since the Enron entry, been justifying higher capital costs of
power projects in India; for instance, while the CEA has estimated the
cost of the Bakreshwar thermal plant at Rs. 2.91 crores per MW, the MoP
has put it at Rs. 4.36 crores per MW.17  The ministry has, moreover, put
out a list of projects with final costs of Rs. 4 crores to Rs. 5 crores per
MW, and has thus sought to justify clearing private sector projects
costing Rs. 3.28 crores to Rs. 5.09 crores a MW (The Economic Times
(editorial) 22 March 1994).
The projects in Kerala too have become heavily loaded with
inflated capital costs, as shown above. The very high capital costs
allowed to SNC Lavalin by the government through a MoU only in the
case of both Kuttiady extension (phase 1) and the Pallivasal-Panniar-
Sengulam modernisation schemes should now be compared with the
capital costs quoted in an international tender bidding for Kuttiady
extension phase 2 project. Among the four companies left in the fray, the
lowest bid has come from a consortium of two Indian companies L&T –
BHEL) at Rs. 164 crores, while the highest from the SNC Lavalin at Rs.
324.4 crores! (Malayala Manorama daily 7 February 2001).  It should
be noted that the Board’s own estimated capital cost for the project,
recognised by the government itself, is Rs. 220.5 crores, i.e., Rs. 2.21
crores per MW! The 1991 project report of the KSEB has estimated the
cost of machinery at Rs. 170 crores, while BHEL has promised, in its
letter to the chief engineer on 2 February 1998, to supply the items at
Rs. 51.5 crores! In terms of machinery cost itself thus there is a gain of
Rs. 118.5 crores, more than worth another two sets of machinery, in
addition to the obvious benefits of encouraging indigenous production
and supply.
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In addition to major contracts and concessions, liberalisation has
opened up another avenue of corruption, that is, privatisation. This has
been the single largest route of payments that has pushed the transition
economies (the countries of the former Soviet Union) to the highest
level of corruption in the world. China too is not an exception in this
respect of its reform drives.18  Privatisation, i.e., transfer of control rights,
is expected to reduce corruption, but the privatisation transaction itself
can be corrupt in the same way as in the award of concessions and
contracts. The prospective buyers may vie and pay for getting included
on the list of pre-qualified  bidders as well as for restricting the number
of other bidders.
Privatisation of electricity sector in the Indian context is obviously
ominous of disaster. The assets of SEBs are highly under-valued; the
gloomy presentation of a sick SEB would further cut into its value.
Howsoever professedly meticulous the assets valuation rule(s),
privatisation would thus amount to a cheap sell-out; for example, the
recent case of Bharat Aluminium Company (Balco), a profit-making
public sector enterprise. The very high corruption potential would just
add to this woe. The whole assets, accumulated by two generations of
tax payers over a period of half-a-century, would thus be lost for a one-
time paltry payment to the then government to squander.
The drive for power sector reform in India has been opening up a
vast field for corruption in which the international lenders too have
been eager to claim their stakes. Such experience comes with its rude
shock from Orissa itself where the World Bank has been a major party to
misappropriate and squander  a good part of its structural adjustment
loan to the state in the name of consultancy fee, service charges, and so
on. The Government has been forced to opt for foreign firms, instead of
capable indigenous firms, as consultants in the reform programme, in
violation of guidelines.  Crores of rupees have been drained away into
37
the consultants’ coffers, of course with a part of it re-channelled  into
some domestic pockets also. The same is the case in almost all the
States, whether or not the Government in power is keen on implementing
any reforms at all. In Kerala too, when the previous government stood
dead against the so-called power sector reforms, there was much heated
allegations of corruption in respect of appointing a Canadian firm (SNC
Lavalin) as consultants on ‘power sector reform-related policy matters’.
4.   Is the Irreversible Surgery of Structural Reform the Panacea ?
Both the Task Force on Power Sector Reforms (1997) and the
Expert Committee to Review the Tariff Structure of the KSEB (1998)
have “strongly cautioned that hasty decisions in this respect would lead
to irreversible actions which could lead to many unforeseen problems.
Besides, it does not help to resolve the problems faced by the Board of
inadequate tariffs, internal resources and liquidity.” (Government of
Kerala 1998:6). Apart from this ‘disastrous irreversibility’ premise, the
very logic of the power sector reform process stands helplessly vulnerable
to multiple points of weaknesses, much of this facet, however, remaining
outside the plane of informed debate. Here we take up some of them.
The Bogey of Resources Crunch
As explained above, private sector participation had been solicited
on account of the fiscal crisis begotten funds scarcity. But this very
fiscal crisis, obvious to any open eyes, has been due to the Government’s
inability to raise the revenue receipts and/or to reduce revenue
expenditures. Instead, the axe has fallen on the capital expenditures, at
the cost of development; and these savings, in a reverse logic of necessity,
have begun to contribute to the revenue account19  – such is the public
finance management of our Governments! Still worse, it is the
developmental expenditures in both the accounts20  that have suffered
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the most, again in a perverse logic. This stands to ridicule all the blab of
financial discipline raised in the face of the so-called fiscal crisis. The
crisis, under the tutelage of the World Bank, awakened the Government
to the prescription of identifying fiscal stability of the economy with
very low level of fiscal deficit. This in turn implied strict measures of
financial discipline through severe expenditure cuts. But  the  guillotine
descended  on  the  wrong  heads – of developmental/capital expenditures,
while profligacy stood to fatten the non-developmental/revenue
expenditures, leaving the fiscal deficit, the alleged prime mover of crisis,
without any perceptible change, even in the face of increasing capital
account surplus, achieved through capital expenditure cuts! If so, if it
was not for translating any effect on to the crisis-breeding deficit, then
one naturally tends to doubt the genuineness of all the fuss and
justification of all the initiatives. Indeed, there seems to have been some
snag in it. And it is to be seen in the effects of a combination of three
forces – the two indigenous factors of the political economy of corruption
and of hypocrisy in company with the exogenous World Bank
hegemony.
 The much-coloured ‘fiscal crisis’ of balance of payments shortage
of 1990-91 came in handy for the World Bank to dictate conditions of
‘economy-wide structural adjustments’ or ‘reforms’ in return for soft
loans provided for tidying over the shortage problem (ballooned into a
‘crisis’). The prescriptive measure of fiscal deficit reduction had a built-
in effect of increasing external dependency and thus submission. Here
the World Bank rose to the occasion and exhorted, besides imposing the
structural adjustment loans, that the Government relieve itself of the
financial crunch by reducing its role to a facilitator only, instead of
being as hitherto a provider. Selling out public sector assets, accordingly,
yielded two birds at a stroke – relief from public sector management
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burden and substantial funds. The offer of soft loans and the option of
public sector divestment were powerful enough to lure the political
economy of corruption, while the populist sentiments pampered by the
religion of hypocrisy, and governmental profligacy21  dared not to touch
revenue expenditures.  And the price was paid from the capital/
developmental account. The logical culmination of such a situation
was the cultivated perception that the Government was left with no
money.   Now the responsibility for developmental investments naturally
devolved upon the private sector, making the World Bank approach
easier. But the domestic private sector remaining not so strong, the door
was to be opened to the foreign capital. This dynamics should have
served as a frame of reference in any informed debate on interpretations
and implications of the so-called reforms move in India.   Unfortunately,
however, this has not been so, so far.
The funds scarcity proposition is still weaker on another potential
score also. Sadly enough, very few eyes have been open to the folly of
the ‘fiscal deficit = instability’ equation setting economics of the World
Bank. This might be true in a Keynesian set up of an advanced economy
where aggregate demand  and  effective  demand  coincide,  leaving  an
inflammable  situation for additional finance unaccompanied by
additional output. On the other hand, in a less developed economy of
poor majority with low purchasing power, which in turn means over-
production or equivalently, under-utilisation of capacity, pump-priming
serves only to boost the economy. However, the main thrust of our point
here is that despite the World Bank compulsion, deficit financing still
continues in India as before, but now only for revenue expenditures;
this is in addition to fiscal incentives through tax reductions. At the
same time, large cuts in capital expenditures also are effected; and this
situation has been capable of fuelling inflationary flames in the World
Bank economics sense, though inflation in India remains (at least in the
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official claims) in the manageable reach only. Such a particular situation
of an insensitive inflationary mechanism22  in force in India, however,
has been sadly missed by many intellectual eyes and the government
too. Thus the government, if found itself still comfortable with deficit
spending,  should have, as is truly expected, drawn rein on revenue
expenditures, and effected that fiscal financing for developmental
purposes, which would necessarily have averted the dependency
problem, and along with it the painful chaos of present ‘reforms’.
The Inefficiency Is Imposed, Not Innate
However,  this would be only a partial solution. The real
resolution should have emanated from the Electricity Board itself with
an active spur from the government. The Board should have been
functionally efficient and financially sufficient to meet all its
requirements. There is no inviolable destiny or curse that public sector
be inefficient. A large number of living examples do shatter this myth
(though it still reigns supreme over a large terrain of social
consciousness). Kerala herself has enjoyed a golden era in respect of
FACT under an able management. In power sector, Maharashtra SEB
had been consistently performing efficiently for a long time till the
entry of Enron. In the Central sector, the NTPC has won laurels for its
top performance23 .  The NTPC, accounting for about 25 per cent of
India’s total power generation with an IC of about 20 per cent, is the
World’s sixth largest thermal power generator and second most
efficient, according to a survey by Datamonitor of the UK (based on
1998 performance data). Given a conducive environment for a
committed management, the Electricity Board could have fared better
true to its guiding principles of a commercial-cum-service organisation,
as interpreted by almost all the Committees.  But the socio-political
populist compulsions of the governments could not honour and ensure
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its statutory status of an autonomous corporation (as required by the
Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948), and they found in it a cornucopia for
their immediate gains through subsidised tariff, heavy rural
electrification, and employment generation, all un- or under-
compensated, on one hand, and corruption on the other. Had the
government compensated the Board for all the populist favours then
and there, at least its balance sheet would not have run into the red.
And all these have never been unknown to any one, and Committees
after  Committees have echoed in vain the same  tone.
The Ins and the Outs of the Reform
However, the government could by no means simply forgo this
easy but powerful vehicle that it was using for translating populist baits
into its own immediate gains and the forced conversion of the Board
into a government department prevailed.24  It is the weight of this
compound of corruption and hypocrisy that in fact restrains some of the
state governments, with ideological assertions coloured in populism, from
openly supporting the reform moves.
A legitimate question might crop up now: Why did some
governments then decide to forgo this cornucopia ? The answer must be
clear in terms of the political economy of corruption on a large scale of
favouritism and kickbacks in reaching agreements with private parties,
besides the lure of soft loans from different agencies, made possible in
the wake of the reforms.25   Kickback rule has become an integral part of
private sector participation in power sector explicitly ever since the
Enron effect.26  The tendency has been to allow the kickbacks to be
included in the capital cost such that exorbitant marginal capacity cost
is thrust upon the system,27  as already explained. The proposal for
introducing marginal cost pricing regime should be necessarily debated
in this light: Should the society be burdened with such inflated marginal
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capital costs in the guise of ‘efficient’ prices? And as we know, this
corruption-push is only one frequency band in the wide spectrum of the
cost-inflation. It is not fair for a ‘welfare State’ to yield to the tendency
to put all its inefficiency upon the public, branding it as socially efficient
costs, though it might be in line with its religion of hypocrisy. This will
unfortunately lead to an undesirable exclusion of the entire poor from
access to light, that even the 50 years of populism could not bring to
them. In fact, one of the serious concerns raised in the context of reform
exercises is regarding the rural access to electricity, which the 1948 E(S)
Act stood to guarantee. It is a well known fact, confirmed by many a
survey, that the unelectrified households in general belong to the poor
of the society – an ironical reflection of the government commitment.
Given the highly skewed income/assets distribution set-up in our country,
then, the so called reforms with its intended functional structure of
market orientation (manipulated by private interests of profit- and rent-
seeking of all hues that now never coincide with social interests – gone
are the reconciling days of Adam Smith!) would stand to darken the still
dark alleys of the poor section. While the government is too eager to
shirk its fundamental social responsibility of subsidising the poor, under
the chastisement of the World Bank and its indigenous pedants, all
these parties involved very conveniently forget that ‘subsidy’ is not a
Third World phenomenon only.
Another important aspect thus apparently winked at should also
be highlighted. The much taunted investment incapacity of the SEBs
has been the prime leverage in justification for the private sector
participation (PSP) in the power sector. However, the SEBs being the
major (if not sole) purchaser of power from the IPPs, the fear of payment
default tends to strike at the very root of the PSP program, and this in
turn necessitates that the SEBs be financially healthy to provide an
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escrow cover for the purchase. This circularity argument just nullifies
the very PSP logic; if the SEB can afford to buy power from the IPPs
(that too at higher prices28 ), then why cannot it afford to have its own
generation facilities (at lower costs)? It should also be stressed here that
a whole decade has gone to waste by waiting for public sector
participation in power capacity addition program: the IC during the last
decade grew at an annual average rate of 4.5 per cent only, while the
growth rate in the 1970s as well as in the  1980s was 7.5 per cent and 8.2
per cent respectively.
The Pandora’s Box
That the power sector has problems galore as the Pandora’s box of
reforms is opened goes without saying. The terms and conditions of
power purchase agreement (PPA)  for the IPP’s ‘must run’ base load
plants adversely affects the merit order operation of the power system,
thus causing systemic inefficiency. The higher capital costs and the
consequent higher tariff rates result in exclusion of the majority of the
poor from the ‘market’. Moreover, the inescapable problems involved
in the irreversible restructuring/dismantling of a complex organisation,
as far as the experience of the Orissa experiment proves, might lead one
to doubt whether these problems are not an exorbitant cost to compensate
the original problems that the restructuring was supposed to tackle. Quite
disheartening are the reports, on the power sector management health
(or even its survival itself), from Orissa, where the World Bank model
has fulfilled its full mission in terms of achieving unbundling and
privatisation. Both the State and the Central governments have been
injecting heavy  doses of finance in frantic attempts to rescue the system
from imminent collapse, while the international Chief Surgeon has just
backed out after the initial incisions, requiring the domestic surgeons to
do what they can to complete the operation! While the governments are
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too eager to let out any signals of a wrong turn during the course of such
a drastic surgery, one would wonder why these governments could not
apply a little of this wisdom and sincerity during the previous phase.
Privatisation of Distribution Sector
Orissa is the only reforming State where distribution sector (also)
is privatised; and the move is on in this direction in other reforming
States of Karnataka, AP, and Haryana also. It is generally recognised that
distribution is the weakest link in the whole structure of power supply
system. The massive leakage from this inefficient outlet in the form of
subsidised sales and distribution loss, including technical loss and theft,
illegal drawal, etc., under protective patronage, have been steadily
sapping the SEBs, thus taking them to a no-return point of forced reforms.
Plugging such leakage thus constitutes the urgent remedy for all the
problems. And a general perception in the informed circle endorses
immediate privatisation of the distribution sector projected as the only
way out (for example, see Morris 2000). Tackling such leakage in many
rural/suburban areas involves “a law and order dimension as well”
(Government of India 1996: 59), and a populist government, so far in
the habit of winking at (if not abetting) such criminal errancy, finds it
difficult to come out on the front.   The Government saves its face by
leaving everything to the private sector. Thus the private distribution
company in Orissa, “the AES of USA is having to employ goon gangs to
install meters,” and to collect the dues (The Hindu Business Line, March
31, 2000). See how easy the problem is solved! A blatant sell-out of
governmental obligations!29
It should be stressed here that as nationalisation of natural
monopoly ensures both productive as well as allocative efficiency and
equity, a vertically integrated monopoly organisation of electric utility
in the public sector remains a foregone conclusion. In fact, unbundling
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and privatisation irrevocably violate this techno-economic criterion
unless and until it is proved that competition, initiated through
unbundling and privatisation, is a real substitute for the nationalised
natural monopoly, that stands to ensure both efficiency and equity gains.
However, the arguments in favour of privatisation focus solely on aspects
of allocative efficiency to justify the move. For example, there are strong
arguments that technological advancements (such as combined cycle
gas turbine (CCGT) plants of smaller size and shorter gestation periods)
render the natural monopoly in generation sector irrelevant and hence
competition for allocative efficiency is possible in that sector – both
competition for market (initially in setting up plants, given a corruption-
free franchise bidding mechanism) and competition in market (later on
during operation, given a highly efficient ‘tatonnement’ agency) are
postulated to be possible. The distribution sector, though  purely a local
monopoly, also is proposed to be  compatible with competition for
market. However, the invariable location specificity of plants other than
CCGT ones and the asset specificity in the transmission-distribution
sector still leave the system predominantly a natural monopoly and its
nationalisation does ensure increased gains in both equity and
efficiency.30   It is at the cost of these gains and with higher (transaction)
costs of co-ordination and regulation that the hypothesised competition
is being sought.
It is not that there is no alternative to such suicidal sell-out. There
have been some informed suggestions on setting up co-operatives at
local levels and entrusting them or the local bodies themselves with
distribution responsibilities. For example, the Task Force constituted
by the State Planning Board on policy issues relating to power sector
and power sector reforms cites the good examples of Hukkeri Co-
operative in Karnatake and Trissur Municipality in Kerala. The former
is one among the 38 co-operatives in the country set up as conceived by
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the Rural Electrification Corporation. Power is supplied to these co-
operatives at tariffs below the standard bulk rates such as to enable them
to operate with a surplus. In Trissur Municipality area, a licencee under
the control of the Municipality is engaged in electricity distribution in
a very satisfactory manner. A number of countries have such alternative
arrangements functioning efficiently.31
On the Grave Implications
The detailed discussion unfolds the fact that the present system
predicament is due to problems that are just internal to the system. To
this extent, then, there do remain sufficient quarters for remedial exercises,
meant to remove the impediments to the SEBs’ improved performance.
That is, what the system today requires is essence-specific (internal)
reforms, not structural mutation as unfortunately made out now, and
acknowledged even in the informed circles, quite surprisingly. On the
other hand, the strict insistence on and the straight involvement in hasty
policy changes in favour of  the liberalist exercises of the governments
are easily understandable. The political economy is witnessing extensive
openings for corruption to scale new heights in the implementation of
liberalisation-privatisation drives. The State’s function is conveniently
confined to its teleological mission of administering its coercive authority
in the defence of property rights that facilitate market mechanism. The
welfare concerns and the development commitments of the State,
undertaken in emulation of and as a counter to socialism, have dried up
along with its fall in the resultant vacuum of a competitive alternative.
As governments conveniently relieve themselves of the socialistic
involvement, the tax income extracted from the public in the name of
the State’s services now becomes available to them for expanding their
own budget on the face of an apparently indifferent public. And
unfortunately, the informed circle remains indifferent to the crime, instead
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of instituting itself as a counter-force on a civic platform of checks and
balances. Public praxis should be concerted on such platforms and
directed to displace the capitalist teleology of the State with a new socialist
ontology for the public interest. Viable measures are still available for a
resurrection of an alternative. For example, power sector could well be
rehabilitated at minimum cost within its structure of public sector itself,
instead of being subjected to the most painful surgery of irreversible
restructuring, as the above discussion amply evidences.
Hence below we enlist a number of feasible suggestions in the
context of the power sector in Kerala which are more or less applicable
to other SEBs also.
5.     Some Practical Remedial Prescriptions
All our analyses have revealed that the problems haunting the
Indian power sector are only internal to the system, and hence there do
remain sufficient quarters for remedial exercises, meant to remove the
problems that stand in the way of the SEBs’ improved performance.
These may be classified into short-term measures of crisis management
and long-term steps of power sector development, as follows.
Notwithstanding the specificity of the Kerala case, given largely as
illustrative in purpose, the prescriptions in general apply in the larger
Indian context as well.
A. Short-term remedies
At present, the Kerala state has a total installed capacity of 2391.2
MW, of which the KSEB accounts for a capacity of 1979.1 MW
(including two diesel plants and a wind farm). However, the firm power
capacity of the hydro (and wind) power system is only 753.85 MW,
enough to meet a demand for 18 to 20 MU a day, against an actual
(constrained) daily consumption of about 40 MU (including T & D
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loss). The contribution of the two high-cost diesel power plants of the
KSEB is only 1 to 2 MU. The remaining is accounted for by energy
purchase – often more than 30 per cent of the gross available power. The
excessive dependence on energy purchase and the consequent cost
burden could be reduced in a number of ways of operational efficiency
and commitment on the part of both the KSEB and the government.
These are:
1. Take immediate and necessary steps to complete and commission
at the earliest all the projects entangled in time overruns. These
are minor projects like Malampuzha, Malankara, Chimony and
Kuttiady Tail Race, and the diversion schemes of Kuttiar,
Vadakkepuzha and Vazhikkadavu, works on which were started
in the late 1980s. Once completed, they will add to the system
165 MU of energy potential. The mini hydel project, Chimony,
works on which were suspended following a High Court stay
order obtained by the contractor of the electrical works in 1993,
should also be saved at the earliest by moving the court for
vacating the stay order. This, in our view, might be an instance of
ransoming the larger public interest for some personal motives.
2. Start construction works on the already approved projects like
Athirappally, Kuttiady additional extension, Neriamangalam
extension and others as well as the 14 micro hydel schemes under
the Chinese collaboration, with a total installed capacity of nearly
400 MW. Caution should be exercised against any room for
possible time and cost overruns; the construction contracts should
be so structured as to provide for making the contractors liable
for stringent penalties in case of non-performance such as time
overrun. The LDF government (1996-2001) was reported to have
made some steps in this direction in the case of the Athirappally
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project by initiating to institute in the contract penalty provisions
for delay – something of the first kind in the history of the KSEB.
This should be strictly adhered to and extended to all other
projects. The savings in time and other resources will also be
enormous. This ready-to-start project should therefore be
implemented forthwith along with the above-mentioned
expansion projects.
3. Uprating,  renovation and modernisation of all the old projects,
especially Pallivasal, Sengulam, Poringalkuthu, Neriamangalam
and Sabarigiri, that have been under consideration for a long
time should immediately be taken up and pushed through for
completion at the earliest. Similarly, uprating and extension of
small plants (Kuttiady, etc.) to utilise surplussing  water during
rainy season will also increase energy availability. Measures
should be taken to clear the silts accumulated in these reservoirs
that limit their capacity (e.g., Idukki, Pallivasal, etc.) and to
prevent further silting (afforestation, etc.).
4. The KSEB has at present two diesel plants (at Brahmapuram and
Kozhikode) which are in general utilised incredibly far below
capacity (often in the range of only 10 to 40 per cent) on account
of the much higher cost of generation. Nonetheless, the Board is
fast setting up another diesel plant at Kasaragode, which is going
to have the same fate of underutilisation. It is high time that the
KSEB refrained from such imprudent practices of wasteful
planning and mismanagement at least in view of scarce resources.
5. Purchases from the NTPC’s Kayamkulam thermal project, running
on naphtha, is a high-cost burden at low plant load factor (PLF)
owing to its ‘state project’ status. Converting it into a regional
50
one is in general recommended as it could go a long way to
increasing the PLF and thus reducing the purchase price
substantially. The government is reported to have taken up this
matter for negotiation with NTPC and the neighbouring systems.
However, an enhanced share of power from the Central pool and
its regular and constant delivery should also be ensured. At the
same time, if the proposed access of Kerala to the LNG grid is
materialised in the near future,  the project could well advisedly
be retained within the state.
B. Medium/Long-Term Measures
1. The only resource for power generation generously available to
Kerala is hydraulic energy. About 40 per cent of the estimated
4500 MW of hydro potential of the state has already been tapped.
The development of the remaining sites is however beset with
clearance difficulties out of environmental concerns. Those
projects which do not face objections on environmental grounds,
for instance, Mananthavady and Kerala Bhavani, that remain
locked up in objections in terms of inter-state disputes, should be
taken up for clearance. And both the government and the KSEB
should refrain from such unwise wild goose chase as that incurring
wasteful expenditures on environmentally sensitive projects like
Pooyankutty.
2. Having no known sources of fossil fuels, Kerala state is to depend
on imported fuels for thermal power development, which is also
constrained by non-availability of suitable sites for major thermal
plants, especially of coal, thanks to fragile nature of coastline
and high density of population, confining the choices to plants
based on cleaner fuels. Kerala should strive for an early access to
LNG grid and LNG-based power plants. The state government
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should lobby for the early implementation of the proposed LNG
terminal at Kochi and the laying of pipelines to Kayamkulam in
the South to benefit the NTPC project there and to Malabar in the
North.
3.  In addition, the following solutions merit attention for the
improved performance of the state power system:
Improved technical efficiency:
1. Though hydro-plants are in general less prone to forced outages
(FO), some of the plants in Kerala are afflicted by very high FOs
(e.g., Panniar, etc.). Regular and timely planned maintenance
along with full and proper repairs well within time will ensure
higher availability. KSEB is to revamp its standards, system and
organisation for proper maintenance of its plants.
2. The ‘wasteful’ gap between installed capacity and firm power or
dependable capacity in Kerala is now about 43 per cent. This gap
should be bridged (for full capacity utilisation) by enhancing the
firm power capacity through augmenting water supply to the
existing reservoirs. In planning and implementing future projects,
care should be taken to avoid such over-capitalisation;
augmentation schemes should be planned and executed
simultaneously with the parent project. This could save
considerable resources.
3. Check the tide of time and cost overruns. The government should
see to it that the future projects are completed in time, without
time and cost overrun. Future construction contracts should be
so structured as to stipulate the condition that legally binds the
contractor to compensate the Board for any delay.
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Improved T & D Efficiency:
1. The long term objective should be to reduce the T & D loss to 10
per cent. This could be achieved by enhancing transmission
capacity, replacing defective meters, effectively checking theft
of energy and regular maintenance of the network Anti-theft squad
should be earmarked compulsory ‘quota’ and strictly policed over
to prevent collusion; administer incentive schemes also.
Efficiency in Management
1. Computerised scientific inventory control should be introduced
on the basis of a thorough study of the existing system, which is
highly haphazard in management of all aspects.
2. Energy audit is another area that calls for urgent attention. Though
the need for it has been felt for a long time, no step, whatsoever,
has been taken so far at all. Energy audit presupposes an energy
accounting, and thus can effectively check unaccounted-for
transit losses. A scientific and comprehensive energy accounting
and audit need to be instituted at each and every node in the
feeder network in the whole power system so that the non-
technical leakages are identified and plugged.
3. The KSEB is to gear up itself to undertake cost efficient measures.
Cost of energy supply can be substantially reduced on a number
of fronts. Burden of power purchase cost can be lessened by
improved operational efficiency – higher availability (reduce
forced outage rates), larger inflow (more augmentation schemes),
minimum T & D loss and auxiliary consumption, etc. About 20
% reduction in per unit cost can be expected on this count.
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4. Over-manning (too many ‘general’ and ‘long’ posts) in
establishment & administration (E & A) along with a shortage of
technically skilled personnel is a bane of any power system, and
sadly this is the case of the KSEB. Trimming over-manning in
establishment & administration can reduce per unit supply cost
by about 10 %.
5. At the same time, it should be ensured that there is adequate
supply of services of technically skilled personnel such that repair
and maintenance works are minded and mended in time. There
must also be a mechanism to uprate and up to date the technical
skill of the personnel.
6. Allowing 1:1 debt-equity ratio can check accumulation of unpaid
interest charges (due to government) and make the balance sheet
look healthy in this respect (on the stipulation that a reasonable
return is ensured on the equity). This can bring about a reduction
of about 12 % in the unit cost of supply through reduced interest
charges.
These measures, if properly applied, can be shown to bring a
commercial profit of Rs. 121 crores (in 1997-98) to the KSEB, instead
of a commercial loss of Rs. 521 crores, at the ruling average revenue.
Given the vast scope for cost minimisation, clamours for tariff increases
lose their justification.
7. Still, along with such cost-effective measures, there is an urgent
need to apply scientific tariff structuring on the basis of such
efficient costs.  It should also be ensured that lifeline tariffing
with prompt government compensation mechanism also is
structured in such a way that the additional costs from such equity-
based subsidisation never interfere with operational efficiency.
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8. Just tariffing is not sufficient. It should be ensured that the sales
revenue these tariffs yield is collected regularly in time so that it
could be used for further capacity expansion without going in for
additional loans, after simply writing off a fraction of the arrears
every year as bad debts.  This necessitates universal spot billing,
and strict inspection for possible collusion of the KSEB officials
with the errant customers.  For this, the ‘collection centres’ should
be strictly made accountable for their monthly ‘quota’ through
both coercive and incentive stipulations.  Similarly, there has
been an uninterrupted practice of non-payment of energy bills
by almost all the government institutions; this practice should
be strictly stopped and all the dues collected in time.
Organisational efficiency:
1. This is in fact central to the improved functioning of the KSEB.
Necessary steps are to be taken to convert the Board into an
autonomous corporation as under the Electricity (Supply) Act,
1948. However, such a mere restructuring by nomenclature is not
enough. The fundamental requirement is autonomy;
governmental intervention should be done away with fully in its
day to day affairs, including appointments. At the same time, the
Board should subserve the welfare policies of the state (rural
electrification and subsidised power to weaker sections) for which
the government should compensate it promptly. An independent
regulatory authority should be formed to co-ordinate, direct and
watch all the functionings in a transparent manner, with checks
and balances on a platform of public hearing.  This will help
dispel the impression being created by sectional interests that
the proposed regulatory body is intended to be only a tariff-
fixing/raising machinery. Ensuring the efficient functioning of
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the board should be the objective of the regulatory body. In such
an ensured efficiency environment, cost increases, if any, can be
justified only on account of factors external to the functioning
of the board.
2. Continuity of management by top personnel at the policy making
level is another important factor. Appointments at higher levels
be made based on selection, and the selected official with proven
ability and integrity should have at least 2 to 5 years further
service for superannuation  Besides, incentive-based measures
be taken for professionalisation of management.
3. It goes without saying that there is an urgent need to stem the rot
in work culture (X-inefficiency) through superior selection
procedures, linking the terms of job continuity and remuneration
to productivity and  accountability clauses and periodical
evaluation of the performance. To achieve these, a package of




1. Complete the projects already
under construction (minor and
mini hydro-power projects and
diversion schemes)
2. Start construction of the
already approved projects.
3. Uprating, renovation, and
modernisation of old projects.
4. No more diesel plants.
B. Medium/Long Term
1. Take up only feasible projects
other than environmentally
sensitive ones
2. Lobby for the early
implementation of the proposed
LNG terminal at Kochi to
benefit NTPC and other thermal
projects in the state.
3. Check time and cost over-runs.
Additional energy potential of
165 MU = reduced power
purchase cost and increased
sales revenue.
Additional capacity of 400 MW
= reduced power purchase cost
and increased sales revenue.
Cost reduction and sales
revenue increase.
Resources savings and cost
reduction.
Resources savings and timely
capacity addition.
Substantial cost reduction, as
naphtha is replaced by LNG.
Substantial resources savings
(e.g., about Rs. 644 crores from
18 hydro projects constructed/
under construction so far), and
additional sales revenue (e.g., Rs.
52 crores per year, were these
projects completed in time).
An overview of the Prescriptions





(a) revamp standards, system,
and organisation for proper
maintenance of the plants to
increase technical
avaialability.
(b) Take up more augmentation
schemes to increase firm
power capacity in line with
installed capacity.





(b) Energy accounting and
auditing
(c) Professional management.




power purchase and thus supply
cost; e.g., with 50 % PLF of hydro
plants, 70 % PLF of thermal
plants, 0.64 % (as reported)
auxiliary consumption and 15 %
T&D loss, the import cost savings
in 1999-2000 would be 32 Paise
per unit sold (14 % of unit supply
cost) and in 1997-98, nearly 50
paise per unit (26 %).
Reduced power import and thus
supply cost; e.g., with 15 % T&D
loss in 1999-2000, power
purchase cost reduces by 6.2
Paise per unit sold and with 10 %
loss, by 18 Paise per unit sold.
Cost reduction.
Reducing over-manning(i.e., to
the standard 2 employees per MU
sold) would reduce E&A (and
thus supply) cost (as in 1997-98)
by 20 Paise per unit sold (about
10 %).
An overview of the Prescriptions
(in the context of the Kerala power system)
Measures Expected gains
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(e) Allow 1:1 debt-equity ratio.
7. Scientific tariff structuring.










(d) Higher work culture
(e) Productivity- and accounta-
bility-linked job continuity
and remuneration
This would reduce interest
charges and thus unit supply cost
(as in 1997-98) by 23 Paise/unit
sold (about 12 %), and by 33
Paise/unit, as in 1999-2000,
(about 14 %).
Inefficiency not transferred onto
customers.
No resources crunch; e.g., the
receivables against electricity
supply in 1997-98 was 41 % of
the sales revenue, and other
sundry debtors, 33 %.
The core problem of inefficiency
is solved.
An overview of the Prescriptions
(in the context of the Kerala power system)
Measures Expected gains
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6.  SUMMING UP
Administering such efficiency improvement measures in the
technical, organisational and financial management could certainly win
the system a comfortable footing on its own. And this could in turn
dispense with the need for the irreversible and disastrous restructuring
that is not only incapable of solving the real problems, but fraught with
dangerous implications threatening the very social coherence. One of
the disastrous consequences of private sectorisation comes from the fact
that a private enterprise system necessarily works on exclusion principle.
The vast scope for lodging all sorts of large scale rent seeking costs in
over-capitalisation results in inflated supply costs that can exclude a
sizeable proportion of consumers with limited purchasing power. Higher
incidence of exclusion would be one of the deleterious social costs of
private sectorisation in a poor country like ours, leading to increasing
or excessive inequality, both individual and regional, and is likely to
result in a loss of community and social coherence.
This frightening fact now prompts us to consider the implications
of equity-efficiency trade off involved in initiating measures of
performance improvement in the power sector. Though in theory
nationalisation of a public utility ensures both efficiency and equity, in
practice both have suffered in the context of power supply in India.
Government interference in the name of ensuring social welfare has put
considerable constraints on efficiency that in turn have, in accumulation,
begun to threaten the very equity issues, and made government non-
intervention a necessary condition for the system’s survival. However,
equity considerations perforce entail State intervention a la rural
electrification and subsidised/free power supply to the poor. Hence the
significance of the need for qualifying the demand for government
withdrawal from the power sector affairs: as already mentioned,
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government should actively intervene so as to engage the public utility
in cross subsidisation and rural electrification for equity purposes, and
it should adequately compensate the utility then and there. At the same
time, it should desist from rent-seeking pursuits of populism, it has been
practising over time, that really cost the society substantially. Equity
involvement by the State is indispensable in a poor country like ours,
where the majority poor are left with no option, a broad band of which is
but available for the few rich. For example, a rich household has the
capability for the personal services of inverter or gen-set, which the poor
are not at all entitled to; similarly, a big industry can have arrangements
for cogeneration/captive power, which a small fry cannot even think of.
In such a context, the State is duty bound to provide the poor with
cheaper power in an effort to uplift their condition. It is here the role of
the State is called for.
However, the beneficial significance of the private sector
participation in power generation should have a say in designing the
development plans. Entry of the private power producers (PPPs) should
be facilitated in a transparent competitive environment to ensure the
selection of least-cost options by the watchful regulatory authority,
who should further structure the provisions for the conduct of the chosen
PPPs. On the other hand, no private interests should have any hold on
the sales end; that is, by no means the distribution sector be privatised.
Collective interests could be safeguarded and fulfilled for common
objectives of development with equity only by the vehicle of public
sector provisions. The present dispensation of distribution of power can
be restructured in a more direct administration of collective responsibility
at local levels through co-operatives and municipalities. This will in
fact enhance and sustain the significance of decentralisation of
democratic power, with the direct involvement of the local consumers in
distribution activities. And such direct involvement alone can rid the
society of feelings of alienation that lie at the heart of moral hazard
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effects and the consequent x-inefficiency. It is in facilitating this that a
State realises its meaning.  By shirking its social responsibilities, a State
ceases to exist in essence. What is required in this light is a strong
political will to stand up to and tackle the problems that are only internal.
“The Committee firmly believes that,
given the national and especially the political will to surmount
the difficulties that lie ahead, the country has ample managerial,
technical and physical resources to accomplish the task of ridding
the nation of the endemic power shortages  which have plagued it for
the last two decades. What is even more important, these resources
applied to the twin tasks of conservation and development  of new
energy sources could do what a few nations today seem capable of
doing - surviving the energy crisis that is engulfing the world.”
- Report of the (Rajadhyaksha) Committee on Power (1980: 5)
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Notes
1 See Kannan and Pillai (2001b: boxes 2 and 3) for details on the
Enron-tragedy.
2 With a reasonable assumption of a plant load factor (PLF) of 70
per cent (that may imply a utilisation of 87.5 per  cent at 80 per
cent availability) for the thermal plants in the state sector, a PLF
of 47.5 per cent (that may imply a utilisation of nearly 80 per
cent at 60 per cent availability, considering the firm power
capacity) for the hydro plants, 7 per cent (for Kerala, 0.61 per
cent) auxiliary consumption and 15 per cent T&D loss.  See
Kannan and Pillai (2001a).
3 For a detailed technical discussion on the reliability of Kerala
power supply system, see Pillai (1999).
4  Note that the total  commercial loss in the sale of 293479 MU at
a cost-tariff deviation of 43.4 paise per unit in that year comes
out to be Rs. 12740 crores only, against this revenue loss on
account of corruption of Rs. 10705 crores.
5 Though theft of power has been made a cognisable offence since
1986 under the amended Electricity Act, 1910, collusion stands
to nullify its effect.  All the SEBs do have anti-theft squads that
conduct regular but superficial homilies of checks and detect
some pilferage cases of lesser fry, just to justify the survival of
the squads. In 1997-98, the anti-theft squad of the KSEB detected
cases of theft of energy worth Rs. 1.21 crores, in 1998-99, worth
Rs. 1.04 crores and in 1999-2000, worth only Rs. 80.42 lakhs.
This steep fall in detection trend, despite an officially recognised
rise in theft losses, points to the need for vigilance over the
vigilante squad itself! The Board as well as the government keeps
the eyes closed and ejects some regular warnings and orders (just
to justify their own presence!) such as the one recently put out
again in vain by which each of the squads at centres of
Thiruvananthapuram, Kochi and Kozhikode is required to detect
cases of theft of at least 50 lakhs units a year (Malayala Manorama
daily 23 August 2000).
6 For example, Mehta (2000:10) cites a case from Maharashtra.
The Mula Pravara Cooperative Society is reported to have
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outstanding dues of power bills to the Maharashtra State
Electricity Board (MSEB) to the tune of about Rs. 250 crores,
accumulated over a decade. The scion of the society had defected
to the Shiv Sena and was a minister in the Shiv-Sena- BJP
government last time. The MSEB still accounts for this amount
as ‘receivables’ and writes off a  fraction each year as bad debts.
7 A high Level Committee even went to the extent of
recommending to the government of Kerala long back to enact
appropriate legislation prohibiting strikes under any
circumstances in all power projects under construction’,
especially citing a ‘classical’ example of three strikes by the
construction workers of a project (Idamalayar hydro-power
project, works on which started in 1970 but completed only in
1987) that extended over a total period of three years and one
month, causing a loss of Rs. 33.65 crores to the KSEB
(Government of Kerala 1984: 57-61).
8 Excluding  the hydro projects of Kallada and Pooyankutty, and
the two diesel power plants. If we stick to the strict assumption
that the original project cost estimate allow for possible inflation
during construction period, such that the estimate be as on the
completion date, then the corruption charges involved would be
very much higher.
9 The Santhanam Committee in its Report on Prevention of
Corruption remarked long back: ‘We were told by a large number
of witnesses that in all contracts of construction, purchases, sales,
and other regular business on behalf of the Government, a regular
percentage is paid by the parties to the transaction, and this shared
in agreed proportions among the various officials concerned. We
were told that in the constructions of the Public Works
Department, seven to eleven per cent was usually paid in this
manner and this was shared by persons of the rank of Executive
Engineer and below down to the Ministry, and occasionally even
the Superintending Engineer might have a share.’ (Government
of India 1964: 10)
10 This has been at the tragic cost of the domestic producers of
power generating equipment, especially Bharat Heavy Electricals
Ltd. (BHEL), which, being up to mark technologically and much
cheaper, has gained good markets in some of the developing
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countries. Till the late seventies, the BHEL had won nearly all
international tenders floated in India for power equipment (Mehta
2000: 15). However, its share in the capacity addition in thermal
sets in India has recently come down to the order of 50 to 60 per
cent: ‘BHEL itself has repeatedly stated that the single most
important handicap it faces in India is its inability to arrange for
kickbacks’ (Morris 1996: fn. 15, 29).
11 The Santhanam Committee noted that ‘There is a widespread
impression that failure of integrity is not uncommon among
Ministers and that some Ministers who have held office during
the last 16 years have enriched themselves illegitimately..’
(Government of India 1964:101).
12 This was the first time that a court convicted a minister for
corruption in Kerala. The starting point was the detection of a
leak in the power tunnel of the Idamalayar hydro-power project
(that took 17 years for completion by 1987 with a cost escalation
of 387 per cent). Under pressure from the opposition parties in
the State Assembly, the then Congress-led Ministry instituted,
on 21 December 1985, an enquiry commission  (The Justice
Sukumaran Enquiry Commission) to examine the allegations of
corruption involving the then power minister, power secretary,
high officials  of the  KSEB, and the contractors. The Commission,
on the basis of detailed enquiry, indicted all of them on charges
of corruption involving huge losses to the exchequer. After a due
process of judicial trial, they all were convicted also.
Subsequently, there have been allegations, followed by enquiry
commissions, relating to the award of contracts in the construction
of other power projects also (for example, Brahmapuram diesel
power plant near Kochi). It should be added that the same minister
along with the officials were convicted in another case also – the
Graphite case that concerns illegal diversion for resale of NTPC
power to six companies in Karnataka including the Bangalore-
based industry,  Graphite India Ltd., when Kerala was reeling
under unprecedented power shortage during the mid-eighties.
These private companies are alleged (in the FIR) to have profited
to the tune of Rs. 70 lakhs by way of getting the cheaper Kerala
power.
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13 The MoU for a 513 MW combined cycle power project at Kannur
at an estimated cost of Rs. 1500 crores was signed in February
1995 by the KSEB and the KPP Nambiar and Associates. It was
one of the nine mega projects cleared by the High Power
Committee (at the Centre) in 1995, when a Congress-led
Government was in power in Kerala. The power purchase
agreement (PPA) was signed on March 14, next year, and by the
end of 1997, the Kannur project was accorded techno-economic
clearance (TEC) by the CEA.  But the project was an ill-starter.
The new left Government in Kerala could not tolerate the Enron
co-sponsorship of the project and hence rejected the State
clearance to the project. However, after some dilly dallying, the
Government agreed to clear the project(the Chairman of the
company being a close relative of the Chief Minister!)  provided
it found a new co-developer acceptable to the State Government.
Thus a  new Kannur Project was then recommended by the State
Government with the El Paso Energy International of the US as
the co-promoter.  Kannur power project was one of the three
projects in the power sector (including the NTPC-Birla sponsored
1886 MW Ennore power project in Tamil Nadu  with 100 per
cent foreign (US) participation) identified by the Union
Government to be presented at the Indo-US summit in
Washington to attract US investment to India during the recent
visit by the Indian Prime Minister there. But the State Electricity
Minister called the joint secretary in the Union Power Department,
on the eve of the PM’s visit to the US and said, “We have decided
in favour of Ennore and not Kannur”  (The New Indian Express
daily, September 20, 2000). The Kannur project is pictured as the
most recent victim of inner party factional frictions as well as
unrequited kickback demands (The New Indian Express,
September 28, 2000). The Chairman of the company himself has
recently come out and reported to the Press of the kickback
demands for Rs. 75 crores by the son of a political bigwig
controlling the government. The El Paso co-sponsorship of the
project also has been recently rejected by the government.
14 The Brahmapuram project, the first thermal power plant of the
KSEB (and the second diesel power plant in the country, the first
being the Yelahanka project in Karnataka) of 100 MW capacity
was implemented with French assistance of Rs. 160 crores loan
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under the Indo-French protocol. The Justice V. Bhaskaran
Nambiar Enquiry Commission has found that the purchase
contract with a French company SEMT Pilistik for five generators
(each of 20 MW) without calling for international tenders as per
guidelines resulted in a gain to the French company (and a loss
to the KSEB) to the tune of Rs, 71 crores, that the contract with
Geo Tech for land reclamation and levelling led to a loss of Rs.
2.96 crores, and that the contract with Tata Project for generator
erection works involved a loss of Rs. 1.38 crores. The files in the
government and the Board, examined by the Commission, were
clear proofs for the high powered collusion that had gone out of
their way to favour the contractors (various dailies
12 April 1999).
15 In this context, Morris (1996: fn. 29) writes: ‘From other sources
we know that for a small favour of a year or so’s extension, a
former chairman of the NTPC had to arrange for a contribution of
a crore of rupees to the Congress [party] kitty. Thus even the
task-oriented enterprises within the PS [public sector] necessarily
have to accommodate corruption. (The state of affairs in
enterprises that have veered too far from their primary task can
well be imagined.)’
16 Rose-Ackerman (1999:28-29) quotes a number of cases of
corruption-inflated project costs: for example, Itaipu dam on the
Brazilian border. In the 1970s, two German companies reportedly
paid bribes of 20 per cent of the value of construction contracts
for a steel mill in Indonesia to a state government official. In
Germany, in the mid 1990s, bribes played a major role in awarding
contracts to build Terminal 2 at Frankfort Airport; according to
the public prosecutor, corruption led to an increase in the air
fares of about 20 to 30 per cent.  In Italy, the costs of several
major public construction projects reportedly fell steeply after
the anti-corruption investigations of the early 1990s. Overall
successful bids on public tenders were reported to be 40 to 50 per
cent lower in 1997 than five years back.
17 Another possible explanation for this divergence is that while
the CEA has been giving original cost estimates, the MoP has
been reporting the final estimated costs, after allowing for
overruns. But as we have already argued, overruns are often
deliberate and conceal corrupt collusion.
67
18 According to Quinglian (2000), what has occurred in China since
1978 as a result of what she calls ‘the marketisation of power’ has
been nothing but a ‘socialist free lunch’ by which the politically
powerful in China have used their still awesome administrative
and personal power to plunder the former state-owned economy
and ‘laugh all the way to the bank’!
19 Thus the revenue account has always been in the red, the deficit
often shooting up at stupendous rates, for example, in 1993-94,
the Central revenue account deficit grew by more than 83 per
cent over the previous year, and in 1997-98, by more than 30 per
cent. On the other hand, the capital account has been made to
register surplus since 1990-91, by cutting capital expenditure
drastically relative to receipts; in 1993-94, the Central capital
account surplus increased about four-fold over the previous year,
and in 1997-98, about 2.25 times !
20 In the revenue account, the developmental expenditures fell from
about 55 per cent in 1980-81 to about 49 per cent in the late
nineties, and in the capital account, from about 39 per cent to
around 30 per cent respectively.
21 Over the high-pitched clamour for financial austerity, loom large
the ever-increasing ‘jumbo-size’ Cabinets and the attendant
lackeys both at the Centre and in the States, squandering public
money at will.  In fact, the introduction and institution of
Panchayat Raj governance serves only to decentralise such
official profligacy and corruption with wider nets. Added to this
is the populist extravaganza such as, for example, the recent
freebies (free telephone facilities) from the Telecom Minister to
all his Department employees ! And still the Government has no
money for the most important power sector investments !
22  It should be noted here that inflation in India in general seems to
have been to a good extent Government-sponsored, through
administrative price hikes and their spread effects (Pillai, 1995).
The almost  non-significance of Keynesian or Monetarist inflation
in Indian economy, thus, needs a careful analysis.
23  “The NTPC was founded in 1976, and was pioneer in India in
developing well conceived and documented systems and
procedures for construction of power plants in record time and
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thereafter operating the plant at record PLF. It is therefore not
surprising that NTPC annually added almost 1030 MW of new
capacity in the first decade (1980-92) of its operation at a difficult
period of the economy. It also had the distinction of achieving
record annual new capacity additions of 2410 MW in 1987-88
and an average of more than 2000 MW new capacity additions
in two consecutive years thereafter.” (Business Standard,
September 22, 2000)
24 Again it should not be misconstrued that a Government
department per se is fated to be inefficient. It is the inefficiency,
in terms of lethargy, incompetence, non-commitment and what
not, of the powers that be that is reflected through the department.
25 There have been allegations of corruption against the previous
leftist Government in appointing a Canadian firm as consultants
in power sector matters in Kerala, in return for a Canadian loan.
The same firm was given the contract for Kuttiady extension
works which the firm subcontracted to some other local
contractors! The works, started in 1996 and expected to be
completed within 3 years are still on, the power station still
remaining shut down! The Government, however, allowed time
extension and also sanctioned the demanded cost overruns to
the Canadian contractor! The Canadian consultants were also
given extension with hefty payments in fees! Again, the KSEB
awarded the maintenance works of Panniar and Sengulam projects
to the same Canadian company, ignoring the recommendation
of a panel (headed by E. Balanandan) that it should not be given
to this firm (The New Indian Express, 24 September 2000).
26  Morris remarks in a footnote: “We cannot ignore the role of
corruption and kickbacks in the preference for foreign projects.
Nearly all high level government officials in informal discussions
agree that kickbacks in foreign contracts have become the norm.
Only the percentage involved varies…”  (Morris 1996:1210).
27 The recent kickback controversy kicked up in connection with
the ministerial shelving away of a private (Kannur) power project
in Kerala itself is a powerful example of the corruption potential
of this area. The situation appears even more dangerously grim
when one finds that this has come from a (self-styled) leftist
Government.
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28 The high capital cost includes, besides the back-door payments,
high returns, to the tune of 16 per cent, on capital also. There
have been criticisms from the SEB-circle itself that while the
IPPs and even the Central sector generating projects are allowed
16 per cent on equity (in addition to highly attractive incentives),
the SEBs are severely constrained by the Governments even in
matters of earning the stipulated 3 per cent return. K.P. Rao
Committee recommends that the SEB be allowed 16 per cent
return to provide “a level playing ground” for it (Government of
Kerala 1998:30). It is an irony that while the IPPs are allowed
entry on the plea that it (this situation) vis-à-vis SEB increase
competition and hence efficiency, the SEB still remains
constrained as a Government department, without having a free,
level playing field!
29  In this regard, one would be reminded of a recent Supreme Court
verdict in another context (Dr. Rajkumar kidnap case) that if a
Government cannot tackle a problem with a firm political will
and iron hand, wherever and whenever required, cannot be a
Government de jure and should bow out of office.
30 Remember, in a country like India, rich with hydro-power
potential, a judicious hydro-thermal plant mix in generation
capacity, along with considerations of high-cost gas power vis-
à-vis cheap and clean hydro-power can ensure this for a long
time.
31 It is reported that the National Rural Electric Cooperatives
Association (NRECA) of USA is engaged in helping to form
small cooperatives of consumers in villages and to transfer rights
of distribution and transmission of electricity to them. This
experiment has been a big success in Bangladesh and Costa Rica
in recent times, and previously in the US also. In Bangladesh, the
NRECA has helped to form 50 cooperatives serving 2.6 million
metres. It has registered collection of nearly 97 per cent of billing.
The growth rate also is impressive – some 1000 connections are
added every day! (Business Standard, April 21, 2000).
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